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ԆUKUK 6&6&StandardII.PS)LAURENTI.PRSXxjp6&6&StandardII.PS)LAURENTI.PRSXxjp 7  )   Њ=#  p.7> # SORITES #jp P7P# a    J ddx ! ddx\ J T--T--\")%3#7)'T--\   ,a An International Electronic Magazine of Analytical Philosophy  j dIndexed and Abstracted in  THE PHILOSOPHER'S INDEX  %ISSN 1135-1349 G Legal Deposit Registration: M 14867-1995 "   S "#H P['C dzP# Editor: Lorenzo Pe9a  j " # X  Pg9CP#  _  (Spanish Institute for Advanced Studies) "   ^ Board of Editorial Consultants:  JeanYves B)ziau, Enrique Alonso, GuillermoHurtado, ManuelLiz,  _ %RaymundoMorado "   h+ "D RegularMail Address:  |F ##Prof. Lorenzo Pe9a ) CSIC [Spanish Institute for Advanced Studies]  Department of Theoretical Philosophy ?Pinar 25 <E28006 Madrid A)Spain :Fax +3491 564 52 52 3 Voice Tph +3491 411 70 60, ext 18 9   R$ ;5#X| p.78X#InterNet access:  Y% 7 < http://www.sorites.org/ >  R& 3q < http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/ >  R' !WEditorial e-mail inbox (esp. for submissions): < sorites@sorites.org >  R( &Inquiries and subscription-requests: 9  P* 7 Issue #15 " December 2004 *=p-p-p-  aԆ=#X| p.78X#Ca  j ;  SORITES ($2"($) <yISSN 1135-1349 77Issue #15 " December 2004 0 Copyright  by SORITES and the authors 9  g 9  Main InterNet Access:   Y* 7 < http://www.sorites.org/ >  Y; 3D   RL !W < sorites@sorites.org > (Editorial e-mail inbox, esp. for submissions)  R7 &< sorites@sorites.org > (Inquiries and subscription-requests) Ca" =p-p-p-  a U 1  1 a  =#[2PG;dP#  b GMX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: D SORITES @ISSN 1135-1349  H ? Roll of Referees  MbRainer Bornp9!IJohannesKepler Universitaet Linz (Austria) Amedeo Contep9!YUniversity of Pavia (Italy) Newton C.A. da Costap9!TUniversity of SMo Paulo (Brazil) Marcelo Dascalp9!UUniversity of Tel Aviv (Israel) Dorothy Edgingtonp|9!XBirbeck College (London, UK) Graeme Forbesp9!ETulane University (New Orleans, Louisiana, USA) Manuel Garc1a-Carpinterop 9!UUniversity of Barcelona (Spain) Laurence Goldsteinp!9!QUniversity of Hong Kong (Hong Kong) Jorge Graciap_9!IState University of New York, Buffalo (USA) Nicholas Griffinp9!EMcMaster University (Hamilton, Ontario, Canada) Rudolf Hallerp'9!KKarlFranzensUniversitaet Graz (Austria) Terence Horganp 9!NUniversity of Memphis (Tennessee, USA) Victoria Iturraldep9!BUniv. of the Basque Country (San Sebastian, Spain) Tomis E. Kapitanp9!RNorthern Illinois University (USA) Manuel Lizp(9!EUniversity of La Laguna (Canary Islands, Spain) Peter MenziespT9!@Australian National University (Canberra, Australia) Carlos Moyap9!VUniversity of Valencia (Spain) Kevin Mulliganp9!RUniversity of Geneva (Switzerland) JesCs PadillaGlvezp9!IJohannesKepler Universitaet Linz (Austria) Philip PettitpT9!@Australian National University (Canberra, Australia) Graham Priestp9!FUniversity of Queensland (Brisbane, Australia) Eduardo Rabossip9!NUniversity of Buenos Aires (Argentina) DavidHillel Rubenp9!8School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Mark Sainsburyp9!YKing's College (London, UK) Daniel Schulthesspn9!OUniversity of Neuchtel (Switzerland) Peter Simonsp9!UUniversity of Leeds (Leeds, UK) Ernest Sosap9!bBrown University (Providence, Rhode Island, USA) Friedrich Stadlerp9!MInstitut Wien Kreis  (Vienna, Austria)J'=p-p-p- `h p x(!0$&b/ jcM"z*!#%2(*,b#-t\  PC(qP#=  /g D SORITES @ISSN 11351349 ;Issue #15 " December 2004  vm ? Table of Contents  ab obb" Abstracts of the Papers9!pi 9!r03 obb" Quick Thinking? Not so fast!  by V. Alan White9!pi 9!r07 obb" Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations. The Persisting Problem with the Word `Consciousness'  by Rodrigo Becerra9!pi 9!r11 obb" Memetics: An Evolutionary Theory of Cultural Transmission  by Asunci;n lvarez9!pi 9!r24 obb" Ontic Vagueness in Microphysics  by Silvio Seno Chibeni9!pi 9!r29 obb" Roman Suszko and Situational Identity  by Charles Sayward9!pi 9!r42 obb" David Miller's Defence of Bartley's Pan Critical Rationalism  by Armando C1ntora9!pi 9!r50 obb" On Quine's Arguments Concerning Analyticity  by Shaun Baker9!pi 9!r56 obb" Against Compatibilism: Compulsion, Free Agency and Moral Responsibility  by William FerraioloL9!pi 9!r67 obb" Mad, Martian, but not Mad Martian Pain  by Peter Alward9!pi 9!r73 obb" The Veil of Perception and Contextual Relativism  by Dimitris Platchias9!pi 9!r76 obb" Johnston on Fission  by Brian Garrett9!pi 9!r87 obb" Copyright Notice and Legal Disclaimer9!pi 9!r95 obb" Release Notice9!pi 9!r98=p-p-p-  b #(`2PkCdP#X01Í ÍX01ÍÍ #Xj\  P6G;XP#=Ca v 30 WB Q a " SORITES ĠIssue #15 " December 2004. issnĠ1135-1349`!%"uă   yIdddy331 WB Q a " SORITES ĠIssue #15 " December 2004. issnĠ1135-1349`!%"uă   yIdddy3 a  a @ ! ddx\ A ddx @ ;----\" yM 7 SORITES ($2"($), ISSN 1135-1349 <http://www.sorites.org 6Issue #15 " December 2004. Pp. 36 <WAbstracts of the Papers 4Copyright  by SORITES and the authors--,a  Ca v   s  8]  Abstracts of the Papers  9   XB 5 Quick thinking? Not so fast!  X =V. Alan White ,a  Hud Hudson has argued that with a few assumptions one can prove that superluminal objects exist. I argue that even if the assumptions are true that his argument, if sound, leads to a proliferation of movers packing given spaces. I further argue that his argument as it  X stands cannot in fact entail that objects moving at any speed exist. 9   X{  Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations. The Persisting Problem with the 9Word `Consciousness'  X <Rodrigo Becerra  a  In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first step even when we want to deny its existence. The link between consciousness and some other mental activity (e.g., awareness, memory, executive functioning, etc.) is a logical next step and there is abundant literature doing this, but not all of them differentiate among associated yet different phenomena. 9   X! ' Memetics: An Evolutionary Theory of Cultural Transmission  Xp" ;bAsunci;n lvarez  a  In this essay, we introduce memetics, a new theory of cultural transmission based on Darwinian evolutionary theory. A brief account of the two man methodological trends within current memetics " epidemiological  and evolutionary  memetics " is given. Memetics differs from other evolutionary accounts of human behaviour in two main points: first, it posits replication as the mechanism for the transmission of memes , or cultural units; and second, it claims that imitation is the only learning process by which the replication of memes takes place. These premises are discussed, as well as some of the main objections raised against them. 9 +=p-p-p-Ԍ X 4  Ontic Vagueness in Microphysics  X_ :Silvio Seno Chibeni    This article aims to examine the import of science to the contemporary philosophical debate on ontic vagueness. It is shown, first, that our best theory on the structure of mater, quantum mechanics, clearly ascribes vague properties to objects. This point is explained by both a general theoretical analysis and by some simple examples. The advantage of these examples over that which has been hotly discussed in the literature (Lowe 1994) is underlined. Secondly, it is pointed out that stronger evidence for the existence of vague objects is available through a series of theoretical and experimental results in microphysics, imposing severe constraints on any theory purporting to restore sharpness in the properties of quantum objects. 9   X 1  Roman Suszko and Situational Identity  X# <yCharles Sayward  a  This paper gives a semantical account for the (i)ordinary propositional calculus, enriched with quantifiers binding variables standing for sentences, and with an identityfunction with sentences as arguments; (ii)the ordinary theory of quantification applied to the special quantifiers; and (iii)ordinary laws of identity applied to the special function. The account includes some thoughts of Roman Suszko as well as some thoughts of Wittgenstein's  X Tractatus. 9   X %  David Miller's Defence of Bartley's Pan Critical Rationalism  X. <WArmando C1ntora  a  W. W. Bartley argued that Popper's original theory of rationality (1945) opened itself to a tu quoque argument from the irrationalist and to avoid this Bartley proposed an alternative theory of rationality: pancritical rationalism (PCR). Bartley's characterization of PCR leads, however, to selfreferential paradox.   David Miller (1994) outlaws selfreference (and in this way he avoids PCR's paradoxical nature) by distinguishing between positions and statements, Miller's distinction looks, however, suspiciously like an ad hoc manoeuvre or as a stipulation that has to be accepted dogmatically.   Furthermore, Miller's move is inadequate because it is a second world answer (i. e., it involves attitudes or thoughts) to a third world problem, that is, to logical paradox.   It is then argued that given the paradoxical nature of PCR, Popper's old justificationist critical rationalism with its minimum of dogmatism and irrationalism is malgr) tout a better option. 9 :'p-++!!Ԍ X .]  On Quine's Arguments Concerning Analyticity  X_ >+Shaun Baker  a  In a detailed examination of Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, I argue that Quine fails to make the case that there are no analytical truths in ordinary language. Drawing on admissions he makes with regard to definitions and languages' relationship to pragmatic considerations, and an examination of his arguments concerning the interdefinability of the terms `synonymous', and `analytic', I argue that analytic truths exist as deducible consequences of the various uses to which language or sublanguages are put. 9   X  k Against Compatibilism: Compulsion, Free Agency and Moral Responsibility  Xh ;VWilliam Ferraiolo  a  Free agency and moral responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism because causal determinism, properly understood, entails that originating conditions beyond the agent's control ultimately compel all human choices and actions. If causal determinism is true, then causal antecedents and laws of nature nomologically necessitate all deliberation, choice and action. If conditions beyond the agent's control ultimately compel the agent's behaviors, then the agent is not free and is not morally responsible. Compatibilists claim that externally compelled acts are not free, but fail to recognize that causally determined acts are, ultimately, externally compelled. 9   X 00  Mad, Martian, but not Mad Martian Pain  XC =Peter Alward  r  David Lewis attempts to accommodate the possibility of both mad pain and Martian pain  X by giving a functionalist account of pain for a population, and an identity theoretical account  Xv of pain for individual members of a population. I argue that Lewis's fails because no satisfactory account of the conditions under which a given individual is a member of a given population can be provided. 9   X +  The Veil of Perception and Contextual Relativism  Xg :VDimitris Platchias  a  In this paper I point out main shortfalls of the three main families of theories of perception and I propose a sort of inferential realism. In addition, I argue that there cannot be a scientific variant of direct realism and illustrate this point with reference to P.F.Strawson's attempt to reconcile, not na5ve realism and the scientific variant as he amounts to, but rather, direct and indirect realism. I draw the distinction between four cases of illusion, and I refer  XS& to one of these, namely to the case of veridical illusion, to show that Strawson's view, put in terms of the Fregean sensereference distinction, fails. As regards indirect realism, I argue against the representationalist account and the Lockean picture of primary and secondary qualities. Phenomenalism is rejected in terms of the impossibility to identify an object  X) throughout different contexts and I suggest that what is for x to be that x in different contexts can be given only by a realist analysis of a material object. Finally, I provide an account of*p-++!!  X what it is for A to perceive that x with respect to different contexts and I conclude with what conditions should veridical perception meet and therefore propose the framework of a new theory of perception. 9   X : Johnston on Fission  X =Brian Garrett  a  In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles Fission and the Facts  (1989) and Reasons and Reductionism  (1992). My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims: o  (1) Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;%"  (2) Fission cases involve indeterminate identity; o  (3) Contra Parfit, fission cases have no implications for value theory in the actual world.%"    I argue that (1) and (2) are false, and that (3), if true, is not true for any reason that Johnston gives.pp-++!! Ca v "1}2 WB  a " Quick thinking? Not so fast!  by V. Alan White`!%"uă   yIdddy"= a  a @ A ddx a ddx  @ ----" yM 7 SORITES ($2"($), ISSN 1135-1349 <http://www.sorites.org 6nIssue #15 " December 2004. Pp. 710 9Quick thinking? Not so fast! 3nCopyright  by SORITES and V. Alan White--,a  Ca v   s  5  Quick thinking? Not so fast!  X =V. Alan White 9   a  In `Moving faster than light' Hud Hudson [2002] argues that by employing simple reasoning with a few explicit metaphysical assumptions, one can demonstrate that, contrary to accepted physics, there must be objects that move at superluminal velocities. Though there is without doubt some very quick thinking on Hudson's part that is more than a little reminiscent of Zeno's, I will show that Hudson's argument no more requires anything in the world go at dazzling speed than Zeno's arguments stood the world still.   Hudson's argument is by way of the metaphysical construction of a supposedly material object dubbed `Quick'. Quick lives up to its name by superluminally traversing a spatial distance of just over twobillionths of a lightsecond (about two feet) in the following way.  XH The distance constitutes the height of a 3-D object `Cone'I HT ~J ԍI note that this distance is only an intelligible quantity in the context of a background space/spacetime within which Cone exists. Thus there may be hidden assumptions about such a space/spacetime that further complicate Hudson's argument, but I will try to avoid these issues in my analysis.I (one dimension is an hour's temporal duration), which itself is comprised of a nondenumerable crosssection stack of 2-D spaceslice discs that taken together make up the socalled `Disc Set'. These discs are ordered in relation to the temporal extension of Cone so that they can be matched with appropriate instantaneous moments in a familiar asymmetric temporal manner. Hudson then posits an interval coincident with that of Cone named `T' which is just over onebillionths of a second in duration. Then Hudson settheoretically maps instantaneous moments of T " the `T Set' " with members of the Disc Set in the aforementioned wellordered manner so that the result mirrors time traversal throughout T corresponding with space movement across Cone. The result of this mapping generates members of another set " the `Quick Set' " the fusion of which produces the aforementioned material object `Quick'. Since Quick is a moving object (composed of spatiotemporal parts), and Quick traverses the length of Cone in just over onebillionth of a second, Quick moves at twice the speed of light [2002, pp. 203204].   Hudson admits throughout this argument to a number of controversial metaphysical  X|! assumptions: that at least one n-D object may have (n-1)-D crosssectional spatial parts, that any extended object has spatiotemporal parts, that fusions of the members of wellordered spatiotemporalpartssets (such as the Quick Set) result in whole objects. He maintains,P# =p-p-p- however, that these are not incredible propositions, and thus that superluminal motion is not  X merely possible, but a fact (if the assumptions are true) [2002, pp. 203204].BXg ~Jb ԍAfterward Hudson expands this argument by quantizing the space and time mappings into four dimensions with `ThickQuick' [2002, pp. 204-205], though this expansion in no way dispenses with a reliance upon the essentials of his earlier `Quick' argument (or its accompanying deficiencies).B   However controversial these assumptions are, and even if they are true as Hudson allows, I will show that Hudson's argument, when fully explicated, entails consequences that are counterintuitive if not outright false. Further, under a (perhaps most) plausible interpretation of what fusions of spatiotemporalpartssets are, I will argue that this form of argument in  X general cannot entail that Quick and its ilk exist.   To see the full scope of Hudson's reasoning, review the following variation on it. Let  X6 Cone and the Disc Set remain as before. Say, however, that T* is an interval one trillion times longer than T " around 17 minutes duration, but still within Cone's time of existence. (Since Hudson places no constraint on the selection of a time interval within Cone's existence parameters, it would appear that T*, and any such interval less than or equal to Cone's temporal duration, can be used in the following way.) Now map T*'s instantaneousmoment set to the Disc Set as T's was before. The result is (what I must call) the `Tortoise Set' " though the resultant fusionobject `Tortoise' would lose a race to all ablebodied tortoises, I suspect. So Tortoise is much, much slower than Quick, taking nearly 17 minutes to traverse the same space " yet Tortoise is constructed in the same kind of way. Clearly then, within the twobillionthslightsecond distance and onehour time limits of Cone's existence, one can construct a very large number of movers (and even an infinite number, given that temporal intervals within Cone's hour of existence are subsets of the nondenumerable set of Cone's instantaneous moments), bounded on one extreme by asymptotically nearinstantaneous movers (like Quick, but even quicker and quicker and 8) and on the other by the slowest hourcrawler (like Tortoise, but taking the full hour to move the distance). Therefore, Hudson's revised  X point should be that material objects that move at every speed possible within any given well X ordered spacetime volume can be proven to exist (again, with his admitted assumptions).   Given the intuitively vast array of Conelike spacetime volumes where such metaphysical construction might occur, Hudson's argument, when applied to the universe at large, indeed yields quite a prodigious progeny of moving objects (certainly enough to induce the infamous Lewisian stare).   Further, since distinct time intervals of any given Conelike object can overlap " T and T* might well overlap by T's duration, for example " then resultant fusionobjects of time X andspace sets such as `Quick set' and `Tortoise Set' themselves are in such cases coincidently  X existing and moving things.g ~J$ ԍAnd apart from an additional assumption that Hudson's time-space mappings must not overlap spacetime intervals distinct from Cone-e.g., as would `Coneahead', which contains Cone but includes an additional anterior spacetime of about .4 inches and another minute's duration (to preserve scale with Cone)-the overpopulation problem here worsens! Such an assumption, however, seems entirely arbitrary, and in fact contrary to intuitions about spacetime continuity. While it is quite understandable that real objects might overlap in this way " consider lightspeed cosmic rays that might happen to coincide with my movement with the Earth by flashing through me within a certain interval of terrestrial motion  X! " such an overlap is typically interpreted as an accident of nature, not a metaphysical! p-++!!  X requirement of existence. Thus every one of the magnificent offspring that result from fertile argument, fast and slow alike, always exist in the company of a staggering assemblage of fellow travelers, all of which exist merely in virtue of sharing their various times with the same space. While this is certainly not logically impossible, filling spaces with a plenum of  X such movers is at best an excess of ontological exuberance.   But there is an additional sense in which Hudson's argument is, as it were, unsafe at any  X speed. Clearly the above extension of the argument does not constitute a reductio or anything of the sort. Given assumptions and perspective, it only serves to populate the universe with  X objects that move at all logically possible speeds (if one additionally assumes that there exists  X at least one infinite spacetime Conelike stretch, to allow for infinite sloth in that case). But  X what objects? Hudson says, as he does of Quick, that these are material objects [2002, p. 204]. But why should anyone accept this claim? After all, even given a fusion of the members  Xn of the `Quick' Hudson's and and likewise sets, these are still sets, the members of which are  XY the result of logical mapping of arbitrarily selected dense timelapses to equivalently dense spaceextensions (it is this Cantorean equipotence of all such space and time sets that gets Hudson' `Tortoise's argument off and running, so to speak). As such, I would argue that  X fusions of the members of these sets constitute at best logically possible objects in spacetime X perdurant objects that must, if they exist, move at such speeds.xg ~Jz ԍThough I won't pursue it here, I should register my protest against Hudson's assumption that Quick and its relatives (including `Tortoise') are properly objects at all, since they are fusions of nothing more than times correlated to spaces apart from any properties instantiated within these times and spaces that could satisfy trans-spatiotemporal identity conditions of what counts as the same object. At best I would call the result of fusion of the Quick, Tortoise, etc. sets abstract objects. Still, for simplicity's sake I will yield to Hudson to the extent of calling such `bare' spatiotemporal-parts fusion-objects logically possible ones.  A recognizable example of such a possible object construction is that of Santa Claus delivering gifts to the world's children in one night. Sophisticated versions of this scenario estimate that this would require a Santasleighvelocity of many thousands of miles per second. What is done here is to assign Santa's work to one night, map that time to the needed distance of travel, and voila! " a logically possible Santa. Presumably, Hudson would not seriously want to argue that a speedy temporalparts Santa really exists. On the other hand, nothing in Hudson's form of argument  Xb prevents one from concluding that the Jolly Old Elf, conceived as such a moving object, exists (largely due to Hudson's failure to address identity questions about fusion objects " see note 4). That alone suggests a laxity within Hudson's argument that undermines the force of his  X conclusion that superluminally moving objects must exist, since they are on a metaphysical par with a speedy but presumably mythical Santa.   Ultimately, the ingenuity of " and the problem for " Hudson's argument is that it is Zeno turned inside out. Instead of producing paradoxes of motion over distance and time, Hudson  X; uses (or, as I argue, should have used) the continua of distance and time to produce a surfeit of movers at all possible rates of motion relative to a space traversed. The fact that Hudson restricts his argument to proving that only superluminal movers exist indicates that either he is unwilling to acknowledge, or unaware of, the breathtaking existential commitment of its complete scope should he be right. If, however, as argued above, Hudson's fusionobject  X! movers constitute only possible objects, then whether such objects are existentially instantiated! p-++!!  X is in fact a further question beyond any fanciful entertaining that they do.g ~Jy ԍIn this way my criticism reflects something of the same criticism Aristotle leveled at Zeno-namely that the latter's arguments conflate questions of potentiality and actuality. Hudson's Zenophilic argument is not sufficient warrant in itself to conclude that any movers, super or subluminal, exist.  X1 a> References ă  X Hudson, Hud. 2002. Moving faster than light . Analysis 62: 203205. a9ك  XP j7 V. Alan White VUniversity of Wisconsin Manitowoc  X Wqawhite@uwc.edu | awhite@lsol.net  p-++!! N%"Ca v 8}2WE  WB i a " Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations  by Rodrigo Becerra`!%"uă   yIdddy8= a  a @ a ddx   ddx  @ ----" yM 7 SORITES ($2"($), ISSN 1135-1349 <http://www.sorites.org 6ZIssue #15 " December 2004. Pp 1123 - Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations. The / Persisting Problem with the Word Consciousness  27Copyright  by SORITES and Rodrigo Becerra--,a  Ca v   s 1} Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological -=Aspirations. The Persisting Problem with the  s{ 9 Word Consciousness   X> <Rodrigo Becerra 9   a  In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. This is, to be sure, a welcome phenomenon for several reasons. First, it reminds us of those old timers who used to be all in one (mathematicianphilosopherpolitical commentators, etc.) and their natural preoccupation  XD with grand themes rather than with specific disciplinary boundaries. It demands from philosophers a sharper rigour when dealing with specific scientific subareas. It demands from scientists a more global picture and intellectual projection of their specific findings. Collectively taken, these processes will advance the study of consciousness. However, the negative side of this exercise is that this collaboration may lead to an overinclusion which at times might mislead the direction and make us feel as if  we are getting closer to solve the mystery, the hard problem, but in fact we might be sometimes getting away from it. Common sense also warns us against this intrusion by advice epitomized in sayings such as can't see the wood from the trees . We are all familiar with the story of the drunk who is looking for something under the lamppost and someone asks him, what are you looking for? My keys. Where did you drop them? Back in the alley. Why are you looking for them here then? Because there is more light here .   The principle that guides this essay is that the study of consciousness requires a multidisciplinary approach because consciousness is, in all probability, a multifactorial phenomenon. However, once this honeymoon period of disciplines is over, each discipline will  Xc$ need to generate relevance if we are to continue exploring the same target. The word consciousness is used with a variety of connotations and it means something different to many. However, once agreed on the use of one connotation, the explorative research should adhere to this, if not universal, at least operational connotation. The exhaustive analysis of this phenomenon might force us to rethink the definition. This would be a healthy outcome. However, a clear identification of the target is still necessary in the beginning. Many publications deal with related but not relevant consciousness  terms and this is dangerous because it is adding related but irrelevant information that is counterproductive to the study of consciousness .+ =p-p-p-Ԍ X   A classic illustration is the paper published by PSYCHE: The Decoupling of Explicit  and Implicit  Processing in Neuropsychological Disorders. Insights Into the Neural Basis of Consciousness?  by Faulkner and Foster (2001). This is an informative summary of explicit and explicit cognitive processes but its impact on the consciousness debate is minimal at best and very likely to be counterproductive because of its philosophically ill informed background. The merit of this paper is simple; it is a good catalogue of neuropsychological syndromes that involve neglect. It clearly shows that there is a discrepancy between what neglect  patients report and their true preserved, albeit implicit, information in the impaired domain; this discrepancy applies to a series of neuropsychological disorders. A brief summary of this paper is pertinent here.   In neuropsychology, neglect  refers to disorders characterised by a lack of awareness of (usually) half of the presented information. For example, patients suffering unilateral neglect  show impaired processing of information presented on the side that is contralateral to the location of the brain insult. Studies however, suggest that some processing, occurring on the presumably neglected area does take place implicitly. Therefore, the patient is not overtly aware of this. The evidence presented by the authors comes from studies investigating blindsight, amnesia, object agnosia, prosopagnosia, hemineglect, and aphasia. Their analysis, they claim, will have repercussions on a) possible clinical therapies in braininjured patients as well as b) the architecture of cognition and c) the neural basis of consciousness in non braindamaged individuals  (p.1). A crucial distinction offered by the authors is about their understanding of consciousness . They state that, although they acknowledge existing distinctions of the word consciousness, they prefer to refer in their paper, to explicit knowledge  as relating to those aspects of cognition which the individual has access to. Conversely, implicit processing refers to cognitive processes, which the individual does not have access to. Thus, explicit memory for example can be tested by asking the individual to report on the content of a specific memory, whereas implicit memory can be detected by behavioural changes due to the influence of previously unaware  acquired information. I will briefly explain the phenomenon of blindsight to illustrate the authors' strategy.   Blindsight occurs when a brain insult causes a loss of vision, as reported by the patient, but there is preserved implicit processing based on information presented in the blind  area. There is ample experimental evidence demonstrating that patients alter their behaviour in tasks influenced by implicitly gained information. This adjustment of behaviour is beyond what chance could bring about and it appears to be directly influenced by the relevant stimulus, with the patient remaining unaware. An important figure in the introduction of this concept is Weiskrantz and colleagues (1974) who described a case study in which the patient developed left hemianopia (blindness in the left visual field of both eyes) after surgical removal of a significant portion of the striate cortex in the right hemisphere. After the patient was asked to visually discriminate between stimuli presented in the blind field, the patient would report that he could not do so. However, when asked to guess, the answer he gave would be strikingly accurate. He was asked to point the location of stimuli, orientation of different lines (vertical versus horizontal), and shapes (cross versus circle). Other studies have found other types of visual discrimination equally accurate in hemianopia patients; for example, reaching and grasping, discerning meaning of words, varied shapes and so on (in Faulkner and Foster 2002).   These findings are analogous to those found in memory research whereby a brain insult can damage the ability to recall new information (anterograde amnesia) and the ability toY*p-++!! recall information prior to the insult (retrograde amnesia). There appears to be ample evidence suggesting the existence of preserved implicit memory. A traditional experimental method uses amnesic and normal subjects who would be presented with word stems for example and be required to complete the stem with the first word that comes to mind. Both controls and amnesic subjects were more likely to complete the stems with words from a list that had been previously studied of which amnesic subjects had not explicit recollection. In an experiment of this nature, the priming effect consists in the fact that amnesic subjects, although scoring poorly on a simple recall test (explicit mode), still showed an influential effect (implicit mode). Similar findings are reported from the visual agnosia area. In visual agnosia patients fail to identify familiar objects by sight even though there is no physical damage to the visual apparatus. However, they can identify objects if presented in a different sensory modality (e.g., touch, hearing). The same phenomenon has been established in Prosopagnosia (impairment of facial recognition) whereby patients have reported an inability to recognise familiar faces. However, they have significantly different (larger) skin conductance responses as compared to their reaction when exposed to unfamiliar faces. In the language domain, aphasic patients (expressive and/or receptive language impairment) have also demonstrated preserved implicit language comprehension and expression in spite of impairment. Further examples of implicit processing come from the neglect area, which is an attentional deficit of (generally) left visuospatial stimuli, normally as a consequence of right hemisphere damage. This hemineglect has been observed in behaviours such as dressing only the right part of the body, eating the food from the right side on the plate only, omitting words placed in the left visual field when requested to read a paragraph and so on. However, preserved processing on the neglected space has been reported. This has been usually investigated using preferential choices in the absence of explicit recognition of the stimulus presented in the neglected space. That is, on subsequent stimuli presentations (hemineglect) subjects would still choose a stimuli (e.g., an intact house) as opposed to a less preferred option (e.g., a house with the left part of it in flames) even when the portion representing adverse stimuli was in the neglected field.  X    Faulkner and Foster's paper was published in Psyche, (a very eclectic and multidisciplinary journal) which deals with the mystery of consciousness and its various contributors are supposed to approach the topic in a pluralistic fashion. However, it appears they are making the topic flexible enough to suit every single connotation of the word consciousness " Faulkner and Foster's paper is an example. The discussion on consciousness is plagued with these sorts of nominal accidents. One wonders if the question asked in the title (unanswered in the paper) refers to the type of question with which this journal is concerned. The authors of the paper deliberately equated consciousness with awareness . From that moment on, everything is permitted and the relevance to the consciousness domain is avoided. Terms such as explicit, implicit, unawareness, (Freudian)unconsciousness, covert/overt, belong to a family of concepts that denote primarily cognitive awareness . As briefly described above, all the neuropsychological disorders mentioned are analysed in the light of awareness or accessibility from the patient's point of view. This awareness represents a challenge of its own accord but it is not necessarily equated with the subjective experience of phenomenal character and the potential link between awareness and consciousness (phenomenal experience) is not even mentioned. The literature on awareness is vast and cognitive psychology has embarked on a prolific study. For the last 20 years it has covered varied areas such as implicit memory, with Graf and Schafter, (1985) being some of the pioneers in revitalising interest; skill acquisition processes (controlled) leading to automatic  (that is, lacking awareness) processes, work which started importantly with Schneider and Schiffrin (1977); and theV*p-++!! learning domain which was pioneered by Reber (1967). The terminology used in these areas moves freely between, implicit learning , unconscious learning , and unaware learning . The same applies to memory, and skill acquisition. These are just some of the domains cognitive psychology has ventured into exploring the notion in which the subject reports being  X  aware  (of something recalled, learnt, or practiced).Xf ~J ԍA good review is provided by Kirsner et al (Eds., 1998) in their Implicit and Explicit Mental Processes . Another interesting recent review is Out of mind. Varieties of unconscious processes  (Gelder, De Haan and Heywood, 2001).   More contemporary work in this area has developed and applied to abnormal  X manifestations of information processing. For example MacLeod's work"Xf ~J ԍMacLeod, 1992; MacLeod, Mathews and Tata, 1986; MacLeod and Rutherford, 1992, MacLeod and Hagan, 1992, MacLeod and Mathews 1991; MacLeod and McLaughlin, 1994; MacLeod and Lawrence Cohen, 1993 and MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy and Holker, 2002." has focused on implicit selective information processing of depressive and anxious patients, and drawing from earlier work by Beck (1967) has extensively investigated the idiosyncratic selective cognition of this population. MacLeod focuses on the cognitive biases of individuals suffering from affective disorders and suggests that these cognitive processes are outside the realm of the individual's awareness. Thus, the thought content that this population engage in is systematically distorted by cognitive biases that take place automatically , and outside the realm of unawareness. Perhaps the best known proposal about the unconscious is that offered by the psychoanalytical tradition initiated by Freud and his invention of the concept of unconscious . Given that it is a particularly familiar proposal I will therefore not examine it here. Suffice to say that the characteristic feature of Freud's unconscious is exactly the contention that is a whole set of memories, desires, fixations, etc. that are not accessible to the individual, that is, that the individual is not aware of them (e.g., a childhood experience/trauma).   Faulkner and Foster's review of implicit processes in neuropsychological disorders resonates entirely with the domain investigated in fields like learning, memory, skills acquisition, emotional pathology, and the Freudian tradition. However, these areas do not  X necessarily refer to consciousness, that is subjective experiences, or phenomenal experience, (qualia) or other more precise descriptors that have been used to refer to consciousness. Their work fit nicely within the psychological tradition, which explains behaviour but does not examine consciousness . It does, fit, as put by Chalmers (1996), within the characteristic concern of psychology, that is, mind as the internal basis of behaviour. It follows the tradition of explaining how  a mental process causes behaviour, not what  a mental state feels like . I have purposefully used the word awareness when describing the content of their paper but the authors used interchangeably unconscious , unaware , and implicit  terms. This reflects the lack of familiarity with the philosophical inquiries into consciousness, which is not a feature restricted to Faulkner and Foster. But one wonders if by publishing in a journal like  X Psyche this confusion might not be perpetuated. One wonders also if mistakes they generate such as the use of expressions like conscious awareness  (used by others too) are innocent tautologies (in that they incessantly used consciousness as a synonym of awareness) or whether it reflects a deeper confusion.!,p-++!!Ԍ  A similar criticism can be applied to Schiff and Plum's attempt to shed light on normal consciousness (Schiff and Plum, 2000). An underlying assumption of their article is that the understanding of the pathology of human consciousness is a first step in understanding mechanisms underlying human consciousness. The paper aims to (1) explore the neurology of impaired consciousness and detail a brief taxonomy of global disorders of consciousness, (2) place these neurological diseases in the context of the underlying anatomy and physiology of arousal and `gating' systems, (3) examine the role of the gating systems in fluctuations of cognitive function and recovery from states of impaired consciousness, and (4) consider the possible contributions of these clinicallyrooted approaches to further understanding of human consciousness  (p.1). The authors' expectations are clear; understanding what human consciousness is via studying disorders of human consciousness is a promising project. The definition of consciousness used by Schiff and Plum is in a way more confusing than that used  X by Faulkner and Foster in that from the outset, this paper appears to center on wakefulness more than anything else. They offer, as their basic definition of consciousness, the one given by James (1894 in Schiff and Plum, 2000), which appears to draw attention to awareness  (of the individual and his/her environment).  tM o  At its least, normal human consciousness consists of a serially timeordered, organized, restricted and reflective awareness of self and the environment. Moreover, it is an experience of graded complexity and  X quantity (p.1)ƶ    The detailed neurological account offered by the authors is beyond the scope of this essay. Of considerable however interest is their understanding of consciousness. What follows is a brief description of the first part of their essay, which is of more interest to this paper in that it specifies the type  of consciousness to which they refer. The taxonomy favoured by the authors involves a classification of global disorders of consciousness that include: stupor and coma, the vegetative state, akinetic mutism, absence and partial complex seizures, delirium, dementia and hyperkinetic mutism.   Coma is an unarousable state characterised by unresponsiveness to internal or external stimuli and a loss of all neuropsychological aspects of normal functioning. In its observable behaviour, it resembles a deep, sleeplike unconsciousness. Coma contrasts with stupor in that stupor refers to impairment of arousal but some responses (although inconsistent) to the environment can still be detected in stupor. The persistent vegetative state (PVS) differs from coma in that in PVS cyclic arousal recovers but there is still no evidence that the patient is aware of his/her environment. The overall cerebral metabolism in PVS, as revealed by positron emission tomography (PET), is reduced by 50% (similar to those patients undergoing deep surgical anesthesia). Some behavioural and physiological activity  has been reported in PVS patients. For example, one patient of one of the article's coauthors expressed occasional single (understandable) words. The patient's PET investigation revealed isolated activity of the left cerebral structure, which was operating at a very low metabolic rate. However, it was still prominently activated as compared to the rest of the patient's brain. Another disorder included in their analysis is akinetic mutism, which refers to a state in which patients appear vigilant and attentive but remain motionless and have a profound impairment of neuropsychological functioning. Neuropathological analysis reveals the involvement of the frontal lobes, either directly or indirectly. An opposite condition is hyperkinetic mutism characterised by unrestrained but coordinated motor activity with no apparent awareness of self or environment. This rare condition appears to involve bilateral destruction of temporal parietal occipital junctions and wider lesions compromising occipitalparietal regions. The authors also postulate seizure disorders as part of consciousness disorders. In both absence*p-++!! seizures and complex seizures, patients develop momentary vegetativelike states with attentional and intentional failures and loss of working memory and intraictal perceptual dissociation. Other less pervasive conditions (in that some functioning is preserved) are Delirium and Dementia. Schiff and Plum state that delirium's main characteristic is a temporal disorientation whereas dementia's main feature is at first a gradually increasing memory dysfunction reaching a stage which might be difficult to differentiate from a vegetative state.   The term `consciousness' used in their paper is clearly related to a family of terms, which resonate with sustained wakefulness , awakening , arousability  and so on. The fact that we are awake  is uninteresting and interesting at the same time. It is intellectually interesting in the sense that to reach a level of knowledge that allows us to know the neurological substrates implicated in arousability and eventually in sustained wakefulness will solve one of the mysteries haunting the study of biological entities. This knowledge is fascinating; much needed and will, in all likelihood, have consequences in many other areas of the functioning of the human brain. However, it is uninteresting when one wants to examine a particular aspect of the human mind, that is, consciousness, and to focus on its basic nature. The state of being awake is shared with many other species and appears to be related to consciousness in that most  consciousness appears to take place when one is awake (though this is highly debatable as well, for example, in pain sensations while one is asleep). But they are still two different phenomena. Breathing, for example, is in a sense even more necessary for consciousness for if we were not breathing consciousness would not be possible. However to include studies on breathing (a function which is also shared with all other living species) in a debate about consciousness  would appear intuitively overinclusive and intellectually interesting but strictly speaking irrelevant.   Because the word consciousness can be used to describe wakefulness as well as a phenomenal experience, it does not seem to be powerful enough to be included in the same debate (or it shouldn't anyway). To do this, creates the sense that we are getting closer when in fact it is adding unnecessary distractions. The study on wakefulness (as the study on breathing) does not appear to shed much light on the subjective phenomenal experience, which one would think, is the main target interest for the consciousness community . And if it does, the link is consistently missing. Different neurological disorders include different levels of cyclical arousal and different levels of awareness of the self and the environment. For example, coma epitomises unresponsiveness to the environment whereas PVS appears more complex in that some responsiveness has been reported. Similarly, absence seizures involve a momentary loss of attentional and mnestic faculties. All these disorders create a massive dissociation within the individual and with his/her environment, momentarily or permanently, which makes the researcher's access to the patient's neuropsychological functioning impossible. Therefore, we can only assume, and rightly so in all probability, that their cognitive abilities are impaired. Needless to say, their subjective experience of colour or pain, etc. is equally inaccessible and the researcher assumes therefore equally impaired. Is this assumption warranted? Is it the same in Delirium as in PVS or coma? Do we have enough information for this conclusion? The authors conduct neuropathological analyses via neuroimaging techniques, which reveal the organic lesion site or low metabolic activity, thus giving a good account of the putative neurological substrates subserving wakefulness, and there is where they have to stop. It appears as if the study of consciousness as such (as in the philosophical interest) requires a different level of analysis.   This present paper does not favour discarding studies of implicit/explicit processes or the neurology of impaired wakefulness. On the contrary the examination of these domains would*p-++!! greatly enhance the study of consciousness. However, first we need to agree on what we are studying. For example if we decide that consciousness refers to a subjective experience which is characterised by intentionality and volition (this is an example only) then a reexamination of implicit /explicit processing in the light of volition and/or intentionality would generate  X interesting and relevant information. The same analysis can be reconsidered with neurological disorders affecting these constituent aspects of consciousness. For example, are there neurological disorders that affect intentionality or volition? Perhaps some do and some do not. Here the taxonomy proposed by Schiff and Plum would need to be readjusted according to which aspect of consciousness is being employed.   The entanglement into which philosophy has driven itself when exploring consciousness has been unnecessarily complicated by lack of agreement on terminology. It would be pretentious and ambitious, for example, to rebaptise Freudian unconscious as a theory of awareness (the implicit). However, something like this is needed. There is a clear distinction between the Freudian unconscious and the state of being awake.   Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, content of consciousness, double consciousness, consciousness proper, real consciousness, transitive consciousness, intransitive consciousness, selfconsciousness, creature consciousness, core consciousness, peripheral consciousness, primary consciousness, second