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An International Electronic Magazine of Analytical Philosophy
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( ISSN 1135-1349
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SORITES ($2"($)
( y ISSN 1135-1349
# 7 Issue #16 " December 2005
Copyright by SORITES and the authors
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* ISSN 1135-1349
H ) Roll of Referees
M b Rainer Bornp9!& JohannesKepler Universitaet Linz (Austria)
Amedeo Contep9!6 University of Pavia (Italy)
Newton C.A. da Costap9!1 University of SMo Paulo (Brazil)
Marcelo Dascalp9!2 University of Tel Aviv (Israel)
Dorothy Edgingtonp|9!5 Birbeck College (London, UK)
Graeme Forbesp9!" Tulane University (New Orleans, Louisiana, USA)
Manuel Garc1a-Carpinterop 9!2 University of Barcelona (Spain)
Laurence Goldsteinp!9!. University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong)
Jorge Graciap_9!& State University of New York, Buffalo (USA)
Nicholas Griffinp9!" McMaster University (Hamilton, Ontario, Canada)
Rudolf Hallerp'9!( KarlFranzensUniversitaet Graz (Austria)
Terence Horganp 9!+ University of Memphis (Tennessee, USA)
Victoria Iturraldep9! Univ. of the Basque Country (San Sebastian, Spain)
Tomis E. Kapitanp9!/ Northern Illinois University (USA)
Manuel Lizp(9!" University of La Laguna (Canary Islands, Spain)
Peter MenziespT9! Australian National University (Canberra, Australia)
Carlos Moyap9!3 University of Valencia (Spain)
Kevin Mulliganp9!/ University of Geneva (Switzerland)
JesCs PadillaGlvezp9!& JohannesKepler Universitaet Linz (Austria)
Philip PettitpT9! Australian National University (Canberra, Australia)
Graham Priestp9!# University of Queensland (Brisbane, Australia)
Eduardo Rabossip9!+ University of Buenos Aires (Argentina)
DavidHillel Rubenp9! School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Mark Sainsburyp9!6 King's College (London, UK)
Daniel Schulthesspn9!, University of Neuch tel (Switzerland)
Peter Simonsp9!2 University of Leeds (Leeds, UK)
Ernest Sosap9!? Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island, USA)
Friedrich Stadlerp9!* Institut Wien Kreis
(Vienna, Austria) J' = p-p-p- `h
p x( !0$& b/
jcM"z *!#%2(*, b # -t \ P C 'qP# =
/ g . SORITES
* ISSN 11351349
% Issue #16 " December 2005
v m ) Table of Contents
a b
o bb " Abstracts of the Papers9!pi 9!O 03
o bb " Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind
by P r Sundstr?m9!pi 9!O 06
o bb " The Mereology of Events
by Robert Allen9!pi 9!O 23
o bb " Dismantling the Straw Man: An Analysis of the Arguments of Hume and
Berkeley Against Locke's Doctrine of Abstract Ideas
by
RhysMcKinnon9!pi 9!O 38
o bb " Tarskian Metamathematics in Carnap's Metalogic
by
JesCsPadilla-Glvez9!pi 9!O 46
o bb " Why Axiomatize Arithmetic?
by Charles Sayward9!pi 9!O 54
o bb " Is Theism More Rational Than Agnosticism: A Critique of Arguments
for the Necessary Existence of God?
by David Kimweli9!pi 9!O 62
o bb " Rules and Realism: Remarks on the Poverty of Brute Facts
by
J.Jeremy Wisnewski9!pi 9!O 74
o bb " What is a Value Judgement?
by Georg Spielthenner9!pi 9!O 82
o bb " Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck
by Gerald K. Harrison9!pi 9!O 93
o bb " Copyright Notice and Legal Disclaimer9!p 9!N 103
o bb " Release Notice9!p 9!N 105 = p-p-p- b # 'N xz P C 2'P# X01 Í Í X01 Í Í 2 # 2Xj \ P 6G ; XP# = / a v 3 s W B Q a " SORITES ĠIssue #16 " December 2005. issnĠ1135-1349`!%"Q ă
y I d d d y 3 3 s W B Q a " SORITES ĠIssue #16 " December 2005. issnĠ1135-1349`!%"Q ă
y I d d d y 3
a a @
! d d x \
A d d x @ ;----\ " y M ! SORITES ($2"($), ISSN 1135-1349
& http://www.sorites.org
Issue #16 " December 2005. Pp. 35
& W Abstracts of the Papers
Copyright by SORITES and the authors -- , a / a v
s $ ] Abstracts of the Papers
%
X B
Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind
X ' A by P r Sundstr?m
, a Contrary to philosophical tradition, modern theorists of the mind have often downplayed
the importance of consciousness. Instead, they have accounted for the mind in terms of
phenomena like mechanisms, dispositions, abilities and even environmental features. One of
many inspirations for this trend is a series of passages of the later Wittgenstein. These
passages discuss a variety of specific mental phenomena, like searching, comparing, understanding and reading. The passages have often been taken them to show that one may exemplify
any of the phenomena at issue without being in any particular type of conscious state. I claim
that the passages do not support this conclusion, and that the conclusion is, arguably, false.
My conclusion is that consciousness may be a more important aspect of the mind than is
supposed by many contemporary theorists"both Wittgensteinians and others.
a% ك
X a$ The Mereology of Events
X N a( by Robert Allen ă
I demonstrate here that it is possible for an event to be identical with one of its proper
parts, refuting the key premise in Lawrence Lombard's argument for the essentiality of an
event's time. I also propose and defend an alternative to his criterion of event identity.
a% ك
X = B Dismantling the Straw Man: An Analysis of the Arguments of Hume and Berkeley
Against Locke's Doctrine of Abstract Ideas
X ! ' by Rhys McKinnon
X " ) a Many believe that George Berkeley (Principles of Human Knowledge) and, subsequently,
X # David Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature) offer devastating arguments against John Locke's
X $ (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding) theory of abstract ideas. It is the purpose of
this paper to clarify the attacks given a close reading of Locke. It will be shown that many
of the arguments of Berkeley and Hume are of a straw man nature and, moreover, that some
of their conclusions are actually in accord with Locke.
a% ك ( = p-p-p- Ԍ X
a Tarskian Metamathematics in Carnap's Metalogic
X _ \a$ by JesCs Padilla Glvez ă
This paper examines how the intellectual heritage of Tarski's scientific semantics
contributes to the metalogic of Carnap, and viceversa. It seeks first to establish the connections
between the Warsaw School in metamathematics and semantics. Secondly, the author explores
the relationship between the Warsaw School and the Vienna Circle. Third, the specific
influences of Tarski's program on the logical syntax of language will be analyzed and finally,
the internal discussions conduced within the Vienna Circle in relation to Carnap's contribution
to metalogic will be discussed.
a% ك
X
ga" Why Axiomatize Arithmetic?
X Q a& by Charles Sayward ă
This is a dialogue in the philosophy of mathematics. The following issues are discussed:
Are the Peano axioms for arithmetic epistemologically irrelevant? What is the source of our
knowledge of these axioms? What is the epistemological relationship between arithmetical
laws and the particularities of numbers?
a% ك
X ) y Is Theism More Rational Than Agnosticism: A Critique of Arguments for the
" ~ Necessary Existence of God?
X q ' K by David Kimweli
) a This paper engages the controversial question: is agnosticism a more rational opinion than
theism? The paper examines the primary arguments for the necessary existence of Gody where
Kant left it; having refuted the ontological, first cause, and design proofs and putting forth the
necessity of God for the possibility of moral experience. After detailing Kant's view of
transcendental morality, I then counter this view with the instrumentalist argument, first made
by John Dewey, that sound moral judgments are made employing the same methods we can
apply to any experience"the adaptive need to transform our environment beneficially. I make
the case that Dewey's instrumentalist moral theory is superior to Kant's transcendental one,
as it provides a simpler and more scientific rationale for moral experience. Lastly, I make the
case that while belief in God has the potential to influence believers to live morally and is
thus in a Deweyean sense instrumental, it has no factual basis and no moral or logical
necessity, and as a result, an uninformed and irrational alternative to skepticism.
a% ك
X # < a Rules and Realism: Remarks on the Poverty of Brute Facts
X $ >a$ by J. Jeremy Wisnewski ă
In this paper, I offer a critical reconstruction of John Searle's argument for what he calls
`External Realism.' I argue that Searle's thesis is in fact ambiguous, and hence that it cannot
establish the existence of brute entities (even if it can establish that we must presuppose an
external world). I further argue that, once properly understood, constitutive rules can be shown
to be prior to, rather than dependent on, what Searle calls `brute facts' " and hence that
Searle's analysis reverses the order of priority between rules and brute facts. * p-++!! Ԍ a% ك
X _ sa" What is a Value Judgement?
X a% by Georg Spielthenner ă
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of a value judgement. I present here
my view on this problem, which is a version of non-descriptivism (or non-cognitivism) that
is similar to but not identical to traditional non-descriptivist theories. The thesis I want to
X explain and argue for is that S makes a value judgement about x if and only if S expresses his
X attitude towards x. I explain first explain this thesis by (I) clarifying the concept of an attitude,
in (II) I defend the identity between having an attitude towards something and evaluating it,
in (III) I distinguish value judgements from judgements that only seem to be evaluative, in
(IV) I clarify what I mean by `expressing an attitude', and in section (V) I give a concise
argument for my view.
a% ك
X ' a Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck
X za% by Gerald K. Harrison ă
This paper argues that if the principle of alternate possibilities is false, as many now
believe, then there is a non-question begging reason to favour a hyper libertarian position over
compatibilism. It will be argued that only a hyper libertarian position has the resources to
provide a principled explanation of the reality of moral luck, something a compatibilist
position cannot do. p-++!! / a v 5 ) W B
a " Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind
by P r Sundstr?m`!%"Q ă
y I d d d y 5 =
a a @
A d d x
a d d x @ ---- " y M ! SORITES ($2"($), ISSN 1135-1349
& http://www.sorites.org
n Issue #16 " December 2005. Pp. 622
Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind
q Copyright by SORITES and P r Sundstr?m -- , a / a v
s
Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind
X ) P r Sundstr?m
%
a In traditional accounts of mental phenomena, consciousness often played a central role.
X For example, Locke, at one point in the Essay, considers whether it might be the case that we
always think but are not always conscious of it. He dismisses this idea on the ground that, to
X ^ think is to be conscious that one thinks: 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is
X I extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving,
that it does so. 8 thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks
(book 2, chap. 1, 19).
In more modern accounts of mental phenomena, however, the role of consciousness is
often downplayed. Instead, the mind is often accounted for in terms of outer
or objective
phenomena like mechanisms, dispositions, abilities and even environmental features. Different
versions of this outward turn
in the theorising about the mental can be found in the
psychoanalytic literature, in behaviourism in philosophy and psychology, and in cognitive
X science. 5 Y ~ J ԍIt is true that there has been, in philosophy and also to some degree in cognitive science and the neurosciences, a
renewed interest in consciousness lately. But this interest often coexists"at least in philosophy"with the view that
consciousness is inessential for much or most of our mental life. That combination of attitudes is expressed by, e.g., Chalmers
(1996). Despite being deeply fascinated by consciousness, Chalmers maintains that large domains of the mental can be
accounted for without any invocation of it. 5
In this paper, I examine one instance of this trend. In a series of passages, the later
Wittgenstein criticised the idea that each mental phenomenon must involve some inner state
or process
, such as an experience, sensation, feeling, or inner imagery. His treatments of this
X : idea concerns a variety of specific mental phenomena, including searching for a red flower
X % (BB, 3), %x Y ~ J r" ԍI use the following abbreviations. BB: The Blue and Brown Books. PI: Philosophical Investigations. Z: Zettel. R1R2:
~ J :# Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 12. comparing from memory (BB, 85ff.), understanding how to continue a series of
X numbers (PI, 151ff.), and reading (PI, 156ff.). These passages are among the most wellreceived of the teachings of the later Wittgenstein. Sympathetic readers have cherished them,
and critical readers have usually turned their attention elsewhere. According to many
sympathisers, the passages show that one may exemplify any of the phenomena at issue
without being in any particular type of conscious state.
I shall argue that the passages do not warrant this conclusion. Moreover, the conclusion
is arguably false. For at least some of the phenomena in question, a strong case can be made
X " for holding that in order to exemplify them, it is necessary that one is in a particular type of
conscious state. # = p-p-p- Ԍ This is not to embrace the view"which might have been Locke's"that all mental
phenomena are conscious. But it is to suggest that Locke and other thinkers of the past may
X have been more right about the importance of consciousness for mental phenomena than we
are currently inclined to think. Even if the conscious mind does not exhaust the mind, it may
X be a rather large and important part of it. ] = ~ J ԍI am not alone in suggesting this. Notably, John Searle (1992) has argued vigorously that the role of consciousness in the
mind has been underestimated in recent philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Galen Strawson (1994, chapters 6 and 11)
also argues this point. I view my undertaking in this paper as supplementing these arguments. While Searle and Strawson
defend the central role of consciousness in the mind mainly against claims arising out of cognitive science, I defend the same
general view against claims arising out of the Wittgensteinian tradition. ]
The remaining agenda is as follows. In section I, I present the relevant passages from
Wittgenstein. In section II, I document some conclusions that have been drawn on the basis
of these passages. In section III, I assess what the passages show and do not show.
X 6 a# I Wittgenstein's passages ă
X In The Brown Book, Wittgenstein considers a scenario where an agent A shows a colour
X
sample to another agent B upon which B goes and fetches an object that has the same colour
X k as the sample, using his memory of the sample. In this case, we may say that B compares the
colour of the object he sees with the colour of the sample he has just seen. But what makes
X ?
it the case that B compares the two objects? What, for example, distinguishes the case where
X * B compares the two objects from the case where he just by chance picks up an object that has
the same colour as an object he has recently seen?
According to Wittgenstein, we are tempted to think that an essential component of such
X ] comparing is a specific experience of comparing and recognising
(BB, 86); unless the agent
X H B has such an experience, his performance is not one of comparing.
However natural this thought is, Wittgenstein believes it is wrongheaded. To convince us
of this, he urges us to examine closely
what really unites performances that we are prepared
X { to label `comparing'. If we perform this close inspection, we find no one type of experience
characteristic of comparing. Instead, we find that there is a great number of states of mind,
X O all more or less characteristic of the act of comparing
. They include:
t M o memory images, feelings of tension and relaxation, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the various feelings of
strain in and around our eyes accompanying prolonged gazing at the same object, and all possible
X 2 combinations of these and many other experiences (BB, 86).ƶ
Individual acts of comparing are thus, according to Wittgenstein, a diverse lot. They
resemble and differ from one another in various ways, but there is no one feature common to
all of them.
t M o We find that what connects all the cases of comparing is a vast number of overlapping similarities, and
as soon as we see this, we feel no longer compelled to say that there must be some one feature common
X F to them all (BB, 87).ƶ
Dialectics reminiscent of this passage show up in many other places. I have already
X " mentioned the discussions of searching for a red flower, understanding how to continue a
X {# series of numbers and reading. In yet other passages Wittgenstein discusses what is involved
X f$ in intending a picture to be of soandso (BB, 32f.), believing what one says (BB, 144ff.),
X Q% counting a number of objects (BB, 149f.), recognising (BB, 165f.), pointing to an object's Q% x p-++!! X shape (PI, 33ff.), intending (PI, 591), saying `it'll stop soon' meaning the pain (PI,
X 666ff.), writing a letter to soandso (Z, 7), looking for a photograph in a drawer (Z, 8),
X saying `come here!' meaning a person A (Z, 21f.), and lying (Z, 189f.). In each case, he
considers the relation between the phenomenon under discussion and some inner state or
process"such as an experience, sensation, feeling, or inner imagery"or class of such. And in
each case, he suggests that no state or process out of the range considered is essential to the
phenomenon.
A note about the relation between these passages: As has been observed (see, e.g.
Malcolm, 9), it seems natural to understand a subset of the passages as different inquiries into
X one more general phenomenon, namely the phenomenon of meaning something by, say, a
X gesture or expression. This subset may include (all or some of) the passages about intending
X
a picture to be a portrait of soandso, believing what one says, counting a number of objects,
X n pointing to an object's shape, saying `it'll stop soon' meaning the pain, writing a letter to so X Y andso and saying `come here!' meaning a person A. It is less natural, however, to understand
X D
all the passages as different inquiries into the general phenomenon of meaning something by
a gesture or expression. For example, it is unnatural to construe the passages concerning
X comparing, searching and recognizing as inquiries into this general phenomenon.
I mention this to caution against quick generalisations over the class of mental phenomena
investigated in Wittgenstein's passages. Even if one should become convinced that something
is true about the general phenomenon of meaning something by an expression or gesture, the
insight may not readily generalise to all of the mental phenomena under discussion. I will
return, below, the importance of recognizing the diversity of the phenomena under
X discussion. D = ~ J ԍSee section 3, claim (4). D
X e Q
a II Suggested lessons of the passages ă
What do the passages that we have just looked at show? According to Norman Malcolm,
they have dramatic implications for how we should understand mental phenomena. Malcolm
thinks we should conclude, on the basis of the passages, that one may exemplify any mental
phenomenon regardless of what goes on in one's mind or thoughts
:
t M o We are tempted to think that your meaning the color must have been something that went on in your mind.
v M But it might be that what went on in your mind or thoughts had nothing to do with what you meant.
v M b 8Instead of looking inside ourselves we should be looking around us, at the context in which our words
and pointing are located. We should be searching horizontally instead of vertically. This temptation to look
in the wrong direction besets us whenever we are perplexed about the concepts of mind. Wittgenstein's
X admonition applies to all of them (1970, 156).ƶ
Malcolm's suggestion is perhaps unusually radical. But with a few reservations, it is
representative of what many readers take Wittgenstein to have shown in the passages under
X " consideration. "X ~ J ' ԍIn the following, I am trying to summarise assessments such as those arrived at by Budd, pp. 216, McGinn, pp. 93117,
Pitcher, chapter 11, Kripke, pp. 4051, and Baker and Hacker, pp. 3589. The reservations are three: First, other commentators are usually more guarded
than Malcolm in their claims about the range of phenomena to which Wittgenstein's results
apply. They usually don't draw conclusions about mental phenomena generally, but only about
some subset of them. Exactly which subset they have in mind is not always explicit, but my %
p-++!! impression is that many readers take Wittgenstein to have shown something significant about
X at least the range of phenomena considered in the passages listed in section I above. 5 ~ J b ԍThe impression is based on the following. While many commentators (for example, Pitcher, McGinn and Kripke) have had
~ J * their focus on the phenomena of meaning and understanding, at least some (for example, Budd, and Baker and Hacker) have
explicitly taken Wittgenstein to demonstrate something about a broader range of phenomena. And no commentator that I am
aware of has discussed the possibility that Wittgenstein's results may apply to only some of the phenomena considered in the
relevant passages. 5 Second,
not all commentators formulate Wittgenstein's result in terms of what goes on in all of mind
or thought
. Many formulate them instead, more cautiously, in terms of what goes on in
X consciousness
, or what goes on that can be introspected
. } x = ~ J
ԍSee Kripke, pp. 49f., McGinn, pp. 104ff., Baker and Hacker, p. 359, and also Budd, p. 25.} And third, not all
commentators take Wittgenstein to have shown that exemplifying a given phenomenon may
X v have nothing to do
with what goes on in consciousness. Mostly, commentators have
concluded that some relation fails to hold between exemplifying a given phenomenon and
X J being in a particular type of conscious state. In some places, it is concluded that there is no
X 5 type of conscious state the having of which amounts to exemplifying the phenomenon in
X question. _ , = ~ J ! ԍSee Kripke, pp. 41f., McGinn, p. 96, and Pitcher, pp. 259f._ In other places, it is concluded that there is no type of conscious state the having
X
of which is necessary to exemplifying the phenomenon. y
= ~ J ԍSee McGinn, pp. 967, Pitcher, pp. 259f., Baker and Hacker, p. 359, and Budd, p. 26. y And in yet other places, the
X
conclusion is that there is no type of conscious state that a subject is always in when he or
X she exemplifies the phenomenon. N
= ~ J H ԍSee Pitcher, p. 260, and Kripke, pp. 43ff.N
To summarise this, each of the following conclusions have been drawn, by more than one
commentator, on the basis of Wittgenstein's passages:
o (CI) There is no phenomenon P (out of the range discussed in the passages listed in
X o sectionI) and type of conscious state C, such that: being in C is to exemplify P.%"
o (CN) There is no phenomenon P (out of the range discussed in the passages listed in
X section I) and type of conscious state C, such that it is necessary that: if one exemplifies
P then one is in C.%"
o (CA) There is no phenomenon P (out of the range discussed in the passages listed in
X section I) and type of conscious state C, such that it is always the case that: if one
exemplifies P then one is in C.%"
On a natural understanding of these claims, they can be ordered with respect to strength,
(CA) being the strongest and (CI) the weakest. That is, (CA) implies (CN) but not vice versa,
and (CA) and (CN) both individually imply (CI), but not vice versa.
To simplify my discussion, I shall set the weakest of the claims, (CI), to one side. I'm
not quite sure what expositors of Wittgenstein have meant by it, and a discussion of this
would take us too far afield. 9 H
p-++!! Ԍ Setting (CI) aside, I shall in the following cast doubt on (CN) and (CA). I think it is
X doubtful that these claims are true. And I think it is clear that they are not justified by the
passages in question. I turn to discuss these issues now. Since casting doubt on the (weaker)
claim (CN) amounts to casting doubt on the (stronger) claim (CA), I will target the former.
X a III What the passages show and do not show ă
To assess what Wittgenstein's passages show and do not show, it is crucial to distinguish
two different interpretations of the temptation of thought that Wittgenstein identifies and tries
to exorcise.
On the first interpretation, the temptation is to say, for any phenomenon P under
X consideration, that to exemplify P one must be in any one out of a narrow range of states of
mind. I shall not try to make absolutely precise what this narrow range of states of mind is,
X i but we shall think of it as including sensations, mental images, and feelings, while not
X T including awareness that something is the case. Thus, on this interpretation, the temptation
X ?
is to say things like: to exemplify P one must have a particular type of sensation, or feeling,
X * or image; but the temptation is not to say that: to exemplify P one must be aware that
something is the case. I will sometimes refer to this as the sensationalist
interpretation of
the temptation.
On the second interpretation, the temptation is to say, for any phenomenon P under
X F discussion, that to exemplify P one must be in any one out of a broader range of states of
X 1 mind. On this interpretation, the temptation is (in part) to say that: to exemplify P one must
X be aware that something is the case. @ = ~ J ԍDistinctions that seem similar to the one I am drawing here have been recognised as important to the assessment of the
passages under discussion. Examples are Budd's distinction between an extrinsic
and an intrinsic
conception of states
of consciousness (Budd, pp. 223), and McGinn's distinction between quotidian
and queer
conscious contents (McGinn,
~ J pp. 79). (See also Kripke, pp. 51ff., and PI, 18797.)
Despite drawing these distinctions, however, neither Budd nor McGinn pays any serious attention to the
second"broad"interpretation of the temptation above. This may suggest that their distinctions do not, after all, coincide with
~ J E mine. (If they have drawn just the distinction that I draw, then I believe they have failed to appreciate the consequences of this
distinction for the assessment of Wittgenstein's passages.) ,
= ~ J ԍExegetical note: The two interpretations do not seem to me to do equal justice to each of the passages under
consideration. I believe some passages suggest a narrow interpretation of the temptation that they discuss, while other
passages suggest a broad interpretation. (And in yet other passages, there are aspects that suggest a narrow interpretation
and other aspects that suggest a broad interpretation.) But whether this is right or not will not matter to my discussion.
With this distinction in place, I shall in the remainder of the paper try to make the
following claims plausible:
X (1) If Wittgenstein's temptation is understood narrowly or sensationalistically, it is right
to reject it in the case of each phenomenon under discussion (comparing, reading, understanding, and so forth). I can compare from memory, or exemplify any of the other phenomena
under discussion, without having any particular type of feeling, sensation or mental image.
X (2) However, rejecting the temptation as narrowly or sensationalistically conceived does
X not by itself give us any reason to conclude that there is no type of conscious state that one
must be in to exemplify these phenomena. This is because there are arguably conscious states
other than sensations, feelings, and imagings; and consequently, there may well be some type p-++!! X of conscious state I need to be in, in order to compare, even though there is no sensation,
feeling or image I need to have in order to do so.
X J (3) We would be justified in thinking that no conscious state is necessary for exemplifying
X 5 any of the phenomena in question if we could reject a certain version of the temptation as
broadly conceived.
X (4) However, it is doubtful that this temptation should be rejected in the case of each
phenomenon. Certainly, Wittgenstein's passages don't provide sufficient reason for such a
sweeping rejection.
While I shall say something in favour of each of these claims, it should be obvious that
I have a stake only in (2) and (4), and I will consequently devote most of the space to these.
I happen to believe that (1) and (3) are true as well; but should they be false, that would not
harm my argument. I will attend to the claims in turn.
V (1) We should reject Wittgenstein's temptation as narrowly, or sensationalistically,
V
conceived.
I will not spend much energy defending this claim. The claim is, in effect, that there is
no particular type of sensation, image or feeling that I need to have in order to compare, or
exemplify any other of the phenomena at issue. And this is clearly right. It may not have been
X obvious or widely appreciated before Wittgenstein pointed it out to us. Thus, philosophers like
Hume and Locke probably thought otherwise. But by now, philosophers have largely absorbed
this particular lesson of Wittgenstein's.
V (2) But to reject the temptation as narrowly or sensationalistically conceived does not by
itself give us any reason to think that there is no type of conscious state that one must be in
to exemplify any of the phenomena at issue (because there are arguably conscious states other
V than sensations, feelings, and imagings).
This claim requires much more defence. To defend it, I introduce the following claim:
X { o (AN) It is necessary that: if one compares then one is focally action aware that one is
comparing.%"
X Later on, I shall defend this claim. P
= ~ J > ԍSee the argument for claim (4) below. P But for present purposes, much less is required.
First, I shall explain what it is to be focally action aware
that one is doing soandso.
X Second, I shall try to make plausible that such focal action awareness is a type of conscious
X state. If this is so, then there are conscious states other than sensations, feelings, and imagings.
And then, there may well be some type of conscious state"for example, the state of being
focally action aware that I am comparing"that I need to be in, in order to compare, even
though there is no type of sensation, feeling or image that I need to have to do so. And that
suffices to establish (2).
X $ What, then, is it to be focally action aware that one is doing soandso? It will take some
work and care to pinpoint this phenomenon. But as a first characterisation, I am typically
focally action aware that I am doing soandso when I'm in a position to report, without
X D' special prompting, that I am doing soandso. By `special prompting', I have in mind here the
act, which can be performed by myself or somebody else, of bringing to my attention the /(
X
p-++!! possibility that I am doing soandso. Such prompting might take the form of the question
`Are you (or: am I) doing soandso?'.
To illustrate, suppose I am comparing. And suppose further that, as I do so, there is a set
X 1 of propositions that I'm in a position to sincerely express, without special prompting, in reply
to the question `What are you now doing?' and another set of propositions that I'm in a
X position to express in reply to this question only given prompting. Let us suppose that the first
X set of propositions includes I am comparing and I am helping soandso find something that
X agrees with this sample, and that the second set includes I am knitting my brows, I am
X exerting pressure on the soles of my shoes, I am trying to make up to soandso for letting him
X down the other day, and I am suppressing an urge to do something more fun. In such a case,
I am typically focally action aware that I am comparing and that I am helping soandso find
something that agrees with the sample. In contrast, I am not focally action aware that I am
knitting my brows or that I am trying to make up to soandso for letting him down the other
X W day"although I may in some sense be aware that I am doing these things.
X
I intend this characterisation to fix the reference of `focal action awareness' rather than
X defining the term. Thus, focal action awareness is not defined as some kind of behavioural
X disposition. It is, rather, ostended as that kind of awareness that is characteristically present
in the kind of circumstances described and exemplified above.
A few words need to be said about the relation between focal action awareness and
X attention. Focal action awareness does not require attention. Or at least, being focally action
X aware that one is doing soandso doesn't require that one attends to the fact that one is doing
X soandso. Just think about a typical case where you are comparing, say, the colours of two
objects and are in position to report, without special prompting, that you are doing so. In the
X k typical such case, what you are attending to is surely the colours of the two objects. You are
not attending to the fact that you are now comparing them. (And, as is often pointed out, if
you start to attend to the fact that you are comparing them, this will distract you from what
you are doing and make it harder for you to tell whether the objects match or not.) But while
X you are attending to the colours of the two objects, you still have a certain kind of awareness
of the fact that you are comparing them. If you are asked what you are doing, you can
effortlessly report, without special prompting, that you are comparing. And this is plausibly
X because you have this awareness" focal action awareness
"of what you are doing.
That you are focally action aware that you are doing soandso does not mean, then , that
X the fact that you are doing soandso is the focus of your attention. It means, rather, that it is
X in the focus of your action awareness, that is, your awareness of what you are doing. When
you compare two objects, you are typically aware, in some sense or other, of doing a number
of things. And, even if you attend only to objects outside of you and not to any of the things
X " you are doing, it is often or always possible to distinguish what you are more focally aware
of doing from what you are less focally aware of doing. If you are asked what you are doing,
X $ there are some true answers you can provide without special prompting, and other true answers
X % you can give only given special prompting. The former answers typically express what you %
p-++!! are more focally aware of doing; the latter answers what you are less focally aware of
X doing. = ~ J b ԍA parallel distinction between the focus of attention and the focus of some modespecific awareness can be made in other
cases. Thus, suppose I attend to something that I see. It may still be possible to distinguish more or less focal elements of my
~ J audition. If you were to ask me what I hear, I might be able to answer that I hear a tune without special prompting, but answer
~ J that I hear the faint noise of distant traffic only given special prompting.
Now, some may doubt that focal action awareness is present in the kind of cases I have
described. Thus, it is sometimes suggested"often on phenomenological grounds"that, when
all your attention is directed outward
, you are in fact not in any way aware that you are
X comparing even if you can report that you are doing so without special prompting. Your
X ability to effortlessly report on what you are doing may foster an illusion that you have such
X awareness. But closer phenomenological inspection will tell you that, in reality, you become
X aware that you are comparing only when you are asked what you are doing. U = ~ J I ԍThis claim is made by Wakefield and Dreyfus, 268.U
However, I don't see any reason"whether phenomenological or of some other kind"to
think that, in this kind of case, I become aware that I am comparing only when I'm asked
what I am doing. Let's distinguish two kinds of cases in which you are comparing the colours
of two objects and are asked, in the midst of this performance, what you are now doing. In
one kind of case, this question causes you to shift some of your attention away from the
colours of the objects and towards the fact that you are comparing them. In the second kind
of case, the question doesn't cause any such shift in attention. (Think, for example, about
situations where you are, as we say, very focussed on your task
. In those situations, you
may report that you are comparing when asked what you are doing, but while reporting this
you remain just as attentive to the colours of the object. In such cases, your report will often
X = be somewhat absentminded). I trust that both cases are familiar. Now, I don't find, in either
of these cases, any evidence that I become aware that I am comparing only when I'm asked
what I am doing. Consider the latter case first. In this case, there are indeed some changes in
my awareness as the question is asked. First, I become aware that a question is being asked,
and later, I am aware that I am answering this question. But I fail to detect any changes in
my awareness in addition to those. In particular, I find no evidence that I suddenly come to
realise that I'm comparing only when the question is posed. Rather, it seems to me that I'm
reporting something I was aware of all along. This phenomenological impression is to some
degree confirmed by the very fact that I can effortlessly report what I'm doing while staying
fully focussed on the task
. It is relatively easy to report something that one is already aware
of. If I became aware that I'm comparing only when asked what I am doing, this would be
cognitively more disruptive, and it would be at least slightly more surprising that I could stay
fully focussed on my task while having this realisation and then reporting it. Consider now
the former kind of case, where the question what I'm doing causes a shift in my awareness.
In this case, there is a change in my awareness in addition to my being aware of a question
and my answer to it, because there is a change of attention. When I'm asked what I'm doing,
I come to attend (or attend more) to the fact that I am comparing. But, again, I see no reason
X ! to think that I only then become aware of the fact that I'm comparing. As far as I can tell
from any phenomenological inspection, the truth is rather that I come to attend (or attend
X # more) to a fact that I was already aware of but didn't pay (much) attention to. # d p-++!! Ԍ Now, focal action awareness that one is doing soandso is, I submit, a type of conscious
state. Admittedly, this suggestion brings us into a disputed, and rather murky, territory. As has
X often been remarked, we possess many concepts of consciousness. ^ = ~ J K ԍSee, e.g., GGzeldere, pp. 89, and Chalmers, pp. 2531.^ And it is true that there
X is at least one sense of consciousness such that some philosophers deny that there are, in that
sense, conscious states other than sensations, images, and feelings. Thus, Michael Tye has
argued that sensations, imagings, and feelings are the only states that are phenomenally
X x conscious; that is, they are the only states that are ever like something to be in. xX = ~ J ԍTye, section 2. Familiarly, the specification of `consciousness' in terms of `what it is like' became widespread in philosophy
through Nagel (1974). However,
this view is controversial. Many"perhaps even most"philosophers of mind hold that states
other than these"for example thoughts and desires"can also be like something to have and
X 5 thus be phenomenally conscious. 5 = ~ J ԍGalen Strawson is the most emphatic and articulate defender of this view; see sections 1.31.4. But the view is also
embraced by, e.g., Block (p. 230), Chalmers (pp. 910), and Flanagan (p. 64).
The issue is elusive. All parties of the dispute agree that there is something it is like for
X }
me when I, say, think a certain thought. Tye insists that what it is like is always solely a
X h matter of what sensations, images, and feelings accompany the thoughts. But others insist that
X S this is not so; that the thought itself can be like something to have. It is unclear, at least to me,
what could settle this dispute.
In the present context, however, there is something more to say. As we are discussing
X what Wittgenstein's passages show and do not show, it is of interest to consider Wittgenstein's
favoured criteria for a state's being conscious. And it seems that focal action awareness that
one is doing soandso satisfies these criteria, at least, for being a conscious state.
When Wittgenstein tried to determine whether some psychological phenomenon was a
X state of consciousness
"or even, sometimes, whether it was a mental state"he characteristically considered whether the phenomenon displayed a certain kind of duration, which he
X v called genuine duration
. For example, in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, he says:
t M o I want to talk about a state of consciousness
, and to use this expression to refer to the seeing of a certain
picture, the hearing of a tone, a sensation of pain or of taste, etc. I want to say that believing, understanding, knowing, intending, and others, are not states of consciousness. If for the moment I call these latter
dispositions
, then an important difference between dispositions and states of consciousness consists in
the fact that a disposition is not interrupted by a break in consciousness or a shift in attention. (And that
is of course not a causal remark.) Really one hardly ever says that one has believed or understood
X ] something uninterruptedly
since yesterday (R2, 45).ƶ
t M o Think of this languagegame: Determine how long an impression lasts by means of a stopwatch. The
X duration of knowledge, ability, understanding, could not be determined in this way (R2, 51.)ƶ
t M o The general differentiation of all states of consciousness from dispositions seems to me to be that one
X cannot ascertain by spotcheck whether they are still going on (R2, 57). P = ~ J ( ԍSee also PI, 148, and p. 59, Insert (a); Z, 72, 758, 815, 472; R1, 836; R2, 63. ƶ p-++!! Ԍ It seems that focal action awareness that one is doing soandso satisfies the conditions
X for being a conscious state that one can extract from passages such as these: = ~ J b ԍIt is not clear to me whether the conditions stated in the passages should be understood as necessary or sufficient or
both. I only claim that whether understood as necessary or sufficient or both, focal action awareness seems to satisfy them. To begin with,
focal action awareness that one is doing soandso is interrupted by a break of consciousness.
For example, if I am focally action aware that I am doing something and then suddenly fall
into dreamless sleep, my focal action awareness is interrupted. Further, it makes sense to say
that one has been focally action aware of something uninterruptedly for a certain period. For
example, I can sensibly say that for the past halfhour, I have without interruption been focally
action aware that I am working on this paper. Again, it is possible to determine by means of
a stopwatch for how long someone is focally action aware of something. Thus, the kind of
assessment I just made"that for half an hour I have been focally action aware that I am
working on this paper"could have been made with greater accuracy by using a stopwatch. (To
be sure, it will not always be possible to make this kind of assessment very precise even with
a stopwatch, since the beginnings and end points of focal action awareness are not always
sharply delimited. But in this regard, focal action awareness does not differ from sensations
of pain or taste, which are cited by Wittgenstein as examples of states of consciousness.)
Finally, one can ascertain by spotcheck whether one is still focally action aware of something.
For example, ten minutes ago I was focally action aware that I was working on this paper, and
I can now determine that I am still focally action aware that I am doing that. In contrast, an
hour ago I was focally action aware that I was brushing my teeth, and I can now determine
that I am no longer focally action aware of doing that.
True, there is one condition for being a conscious state which Wittgenstein mentions and
which is not satisfied by focal action awareness: focal action awareness is not interrupted by
any shift in attention (for this condition, see the first of three passages quoted above). I may
shift my attention, say, from substantive to formal aspects of the paper, and yet remain focally
action aware that I am working on it. But then, it seems that this condition should at least not
X 7 be a necessary condition for being a state of consciousness, by Wittgenstein's own lights.
Wittgenstein thinks that hearing a tone and a sensation of pain are conscious states (first
passage quoted above), and neither are those are interrupted by any change of attention. If I
hear a tone or feel a pain, I may shift my attention in various ways and still hear the tone or
feel the pain.
So, focal action awareness that one is doing soandso is, arguably, a kind of conscious
state. That is at least what many"perhaps most"contemporary philosophers of mind would
think or allow. And it is also the verdict one seems to reach if one considers Wittgenstein's
criteria for a state's being conscious. But if focal action awareness is a conscious state, then
there are conscious states other than sensations, feelings, and imagings. And hence, there may
well be a type of conscious state"for example, a certain state of focal action awareness"that
I need to be in, in order to compare, even though there is no sensation, feeling or image that
I need to have to do so. And that suffices to establish (2).
V # (3) We would be justified in thinking that no conscious state is necessary for exemplifying
any of the phenomena in question if we could reject a certain version of the temptation as
V % broadly conceived. % p-++!! Ԍ To repeat: On the broad interpretation, the temptation is to say, for any phenomenon P
X under discussion, that to exemplify P one must be in any one out of a broader range of states
X of mind. On this interpretation, as opposed to the former interpretation, the temptation is (in
X part) to say that: to exemplify P one must be aware that something is the case.
Wittgenstein's discussion of reading"or one strand of this discussion at any rate"affords
us an example of a temptation thus broadly conceived. Part of the formulation of the
temptation in this case is: A man surely knows whether he is reading or only pretending to
X read!
(PI, 159). Judging by this particular formulation, it seems that the temptation under
X discussion is to say that some sort of awareness or knowledge that one is reading is necessary
X for reading. = ~ J * ԍOther passages that invite a broad interpretation of the temptation under treatment are the discussions of writing a letter
to soandso, and of looking for a photograph in a drawer, in Z, 7 and 8 respectively.
If we could show this temptation to be false, then I think we could reasonably conclude
that there is no type of conscious state that one must be in, in order to read; and analogous
conclusions would be warranted for the other phenomena under discussion: for example, if
awareness that one is comparing is not necessary for comparing, then it is reasonable to
conclude that no conscious state is necessary for comparing.
Why would these conclusions be reasonable? After all, awareness that one is doing so X andso is at most one type of conscious state. How can it be reasonable to conclude that no
X conscious state necessarily accompanies doing soandso on the basis of ruling out that that
type of conscious state necessarily accompanies doing soandso?
X 1 The answer is that there is, arguably, no more plausible candidate, among the states of
consciousness, for being a necessary accompaniment of comparing than the (focal action)
awareness that one is comparing. Contrast the focal action awareness that one is comparing
X with, say, the feelings of tension and strain that Wittgenstein considers in The Brown Book.
X Clearly, focal action awareness that one is comparing is a more plausible candidate for being
a necessary accompaniment of comparing than are feelings of strain and tension. Arguably
however, there is no more plausible candidate, among the states of consciousness, for being
a necessary accompaniment of comparing than the focal action awareness that one is
X comparing. That's why it would be reasonable to conclude that no conscious state is necessary
for comparing, if we could rule out that focal action awareness that one is comparing is not
X S necessary for doing so. 5 S = ~ J H! ԍTo draw this kind of conclusion, one must be careful to really identify the most plausible candidates, among the states
of consciousness, for being necessary accompaniments of whatever phenomena one investigates. An illustrative failure to do
so is provided by one passage from Malcolm. In the relevant passage (p. 10), Malcolm initially follows Wittgenstein in rejecting
~ J # the idea that a person who points to an object's colour must attend to, and in that sense be aware of, the object's colour. With
this rejection, I have no quarrel. But on the basis of it, Malcolm proceeds to the conclusion quoted above, that pointing to an
object's colour may have nothing to do
with what goes on in mind or thoughts. And this conclusion is not justified. It is not
~ J % justified because attending to, or being aware of, an object's colour is not the most plausible candidate, among the states and
processes of mind and thought, for being necessary to pointing to an object's colour. A more plausible candidate is being aware
~ J ' that one is pointing to the object's colour. (And clearly I can be aware that I am pointing to an object's colour without attending
~ J P( to, or being aware of the object's colour.)5
As I said above, I think this is correct, but it is not essential to my argument. Essential,
on the other hand, is the following point: p-++!! Ԍ V (4) It is, however, doubtful that this version of the broad temptation should be rejected
in the case of each phenomenon under consideration. Certainly, Wittgenstein's passages don't
V provide sufficient reason for such a general rejection.
To support this, I return to the claim (AN), which says that in order to compare, one must
be focally action aware that one is comparing. If (AN) is true, th